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a b s t r a c t
Cascading blackouts can be thought of as initiating events followed by propagating events that progres-
sively weaken the power system. We briefly discuss the implications for assessing cascading risk by
proper sampling from the various sources of uncertainty and for mitigating cascading risk by reducing
both the initiating events and their propagation.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cascading failure can be defined as a sequence of dependent
events that successively weakens or degrades the power system
[1]. The events are often individual power system components being
outaged or damaged or misoperating, but can also include a device
functioning as designedbut nevertheless contributing to the cascade,
or adverse actions by software, automatic controls, or operators
[2–6]. This short paper describes the overall structure of cascading
and the various sources of uncertainty in order to foster more
comprehensive modeling and mitigation of cascading blackouts.
As shown in Fig. 1, cascading failure starts with a primary or
‘‘trigger” event and proceeds with further secondary events. All
the events interact with the system state as the cascade proceeds.
The occurrence of each event depends on the system state, the sys-
tem state is affected by every event that has already occurred, and
the system state degrades throughout the cascade. The progressive
weakening or degradation of the system as the cascade propagates
is characteristic of cascading failure [2,3,6,7]. The system state
includes such factors as which components are in service,
component loadings,which controlmodes and operational schemes
are active, generation margin, hidden failures, and situational
awareness.
Substantial cascading events are rare because the initial system
state is usually robust enough that it withstands the first few
events and the cascade stops. But in an unfavorable initial system
state, a trigger event can lead to many further events that become a
substantial cascade and blackout. The progressive degradation of
the system as the cascading events progress make it much more
likely in each stage of the cascade that there are further cascading
events than if the events were independent [8–10].1 There is a
small but significant probability of a long series of cascading events,
and the probability distribution of observed cascading size has a
‘‘heavy tail” or ‘‘power law region” that implies a substantial risk
of occasional large blackouts [11–14].
2. Overall cascade structure
It is useful to divide the cascading events into initiating and
propagating events:
cascading ¼ initiating events then propagation
The trigger event may immediately cause further events, which,
together with the trigger event itself, form the initiating events (for
example, see the protection control groups in [15]). The propagat-
ing events are any events following the initiating events. It is con-
venient to think of any series of events as a cascade [16].2 Many
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1 Not all events during cascades are dependent on the previous events; unrelated
outages can occur and can have either substantial or minimal effects on the
subsequent cascading. Data analysis in [10] estimates that about 6% of propagating
outages in cascades are unrelated.
2 For assessing cascading probability, it is just as important to consider the events
that do not cascade further as the events that do cascade further. Focusing only on the
multiple cascading events would strongly skew any statistics towards unreliability.
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cascades stop quickly so that there are no propagating events [10].
Examples of trigger events include short circuits due to lightning
or tree contacts or animals, severe weather, earthquakes, operational
or planning errors, equipment failure, or vandalism.
Making the distinction between triggering events and propagat-
ing events is useful because they have different mechanisms and
analyses. The triggers are random failures often occurring at ran-
dom times with no preceding cause within the power system,
whereas the propagating events arise jointly from the preceding
events and the changing power system state. The statistics of the
trigger events3 follow from standard risk analysis [17], whereas
the propagating events are much more complicated and probability
models for their analysis are only starting to emerge [7,16,9].
It is sometimes useful to group the events into generations. For
example, if the timing of events is available, then events following
each other within the fast timescale of automatic protection
actions or that cannot be distinguished from simultaneous events
due to the time discretization can be grouped into the same gener-
ation [16]. Another example is that simulations often produce mul-
tiple events in each ‘‘pass” of the simulation that can be grouped
together [19]. The first generation of the cascade is the initiating
events, and the subsequent generations are groupings of the prop-
agating events. In many observed blackouts the events happen
more quickly later in the cascade [20] and some researchers sug-
gest dividing the cascading into slow cascading followed by fast
cascading [21].
Some evidence for the overall cascading structure asserted in
this section is provided by the validation with real blackout data
of models that include this structure [16,22].
3. Implications of cascade structure
This section shows how the cascade structure determines how
cascading simulations should sample from uncertainty and how
cascades can be mitigated. Sampling from the uncertainties in each
of the initial state, the trigger event, and the progress of the cas-
cade is indicated. Mitigation of cascading should not only address
the initiating events and the small blackouts, but also the cascade
propagation and large blackouts. In the longer term, complex sys-
tem considerations shape the effects of mitigation as the power
system evolves.
3.1. Sampling in cascading simulations
The structure of cascading and the various sources of uncer-
tainty affect how simulations should sample or select the cases
to be run in order to assess cascading risk. Each cascade is strongly
and jointly influenced by the initial system state and the trigger
event. For example, a given trigger event may lead to further cas-
cading events in only a few of the plausible initial system states.
And different system states are either invulnerable to cascading
or vulnerable to cascading with different triggers. Another example
is that a given cascade might stop at the fourth event when the cas-
cade starts from some initial system state and continues past the
fourth event when the cascade starts from another initial system
state because of differences that affect the threshold condition
for the fifth event. It follows that trigger events and initial system
states must be jointly sampled for each simulated cascade.
The threshold conditions for further outages are typically com-
plicated functions of the previous events and the state, and it is
often useful to model probabilistically the condition for a further
outage of a given component and the progress of the cascade.
Indeed, similar initiating events under similar conditions can prop-
agate differently on different occasions in the real power system.
The simulation should sample from the uncertainties in the system
state, the trigger events, and the progress of the cascade. These
comments also apply to selecting the initial system states and trig-
ger events of simulations that model the cascade evolution deter-
ministically. It is unrealistic to simulate the same cascade very
many times, and the sampling from the uncertainties provides a
realistic variety of cascades. Moreover, the uncertainties should
be sampled in an unbiased way across the full ranges of uncertain-
ties in order to properly estimate the probabilities and risks of
cascading.
A significant exception to the sampling requirements is using
simulation to reproduce a particular blackout that has already
occurred. In this case, the initial state and trigger events are
known, and the simulation thresholds and models can be skillfully
tuned to reproduce the observed sequence of events [23]. The ben-
efit is understanding that particular blackout, and no probabilistic
conclusions are or can be sought. Indeed, statistics cannot be
derived from only one sample [24].
3.2. Mitigation of cascading
The structure of cascading affects the mitigation strategies for
triggers and for propagation. The initiating events can be associ-
ated with the cause of the trigger events and the immediately fol-
lowing actions of the protection system. For mitigating the
initiating events, the different trigger causes need to be analyzed
separately, and there is considerable risk analysis and experience
that supports this analysis [17].
Establishing chains of causation in an instance of cascading is
useful, but, beyond observing that there are multiple dependencies
contributing to cascade propagation, there is currently no clear
way to attribute causes for complicated cascades. Cascading events
are often classified by their root cause, which is the cause of the
triggering event. This is useful in mitigating the triggers associated
with cascading but root cause analysis does not address the causes
or mitigation of propagation. However, it is becoming feasible to
relate candidate mitigations such as line upgrades to reductions
in propagation or large blackout risk [25–27].
event eventevent eventeventevent event
initial
state
changing state as cascade propagates ... 
trigger 
generation1 initiating events generation 2 events generation 3 events  
...
...
...
...
Fig. 1. Overall structure of cascading failure in which events are grouped into successive generations. A trigger event followed by immediate protection actions forms an
initiating generation of events. Subsequent generations of cascading events can follow, and the system state changes and weakens as the cascading events propagate.
3 The initiating events that are not trigger events arise in various ways with
amenability to known risk analysis as described in [18].
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The emerging capability to quantify the average amount of
propagation of cascades [16] opens up the possibility of directly
monitoring and mitigating the propagation. The average propaga-
tion is independent of the initiating events and is a measure of
overall system resilience in the sense that initial outages will on
average produce smaller cascades in power systems with lower
propagation. There are a variety of mechanisms that contribute
to cascade propagation, often entirely different from the mecha-
nisms and causes for the initiating events. Therefore the mitigation
of the initiating events and the propagation differ. For example,
clusters of lines that outage together more often during propaga-
tion can be identified, but these lines can differ from the lines that
more often trigger large blackouts [25,10,26].
Since larger blackouts result from both initiating events and the
subsequent propagation of events, it is important to monitor and
jointly mitigate both the initiating events and the propagation.
Decreasing the risk of initiating events while increasing the risk
of propagation may not minimize the overall cascading risk. Limit-
ing the triggers and initiating events reduces the frequency of all
blackouts, whereas limiting the propagation tends to reduce large
blackouts, but may have little effect on the frequency of short
cascades.
Over a long time scale, as the power system slowly evolves and
upgrades in response to the changing patterns of load and genera-
tion, the power system will also respond to any mitigations, and
the eventual impact of the mitigation will generally be different
than its short term impact. For example, a mitigation initially made
to benefit reliability may eventually enable increased transfers that
bring economic benefits but eliminate the initial reliability benefit
[28]. Mitigating small blackouts in the short term can increase the
risk of large blackouts in the long term. That is, we can consider the
complex system view in which the power system balances both
economic pressure to limit upgrade and operational costs and
pressure to maintain reliability by investing in upgrades and max-
imizing transmission. Then a reduction in small blackouts allows
economics to drive the system closer to its operational limits and
eventually increase the frequency of large blackouts [13]. Thus it
is necessary to consider the joint mitigation of small and large
blackouts in both the short term and the long term. For example,
one can either look for line upgrades that reduce both small and
large blackouts in the current power system, or choose sets of line
upgrades that have that combined effect. Then one can consider
how the benefits of the upgrades evolve as the power system
and its operation adapt to the upgrades.
4. Conclusion
Analyzing, simulating, and mitigating cascading blackouts in
electric power systems poses substantial challenges due to the
substantial complexities, dependencies and uncertainties of cas-
cading failure. The current state of the art is to study parts or
aspects of the cascading phenomena. In advocating for a more
comprehensive approach, it seems timely to state the basic struc-
ture of cascading and briefly outline some implications for simulat-
ing and mitigating cascading risk. Risk assessment must sample
from uncertainties in each of the initial power system state, the ini-
tiating events, and the progress of the cascade. The initiating
events and the subsequently propagating cascading events that
combine to produce large blackouts have different mechanisms,
and hence different analyses, and different mitigations. Conven-
tional risk analysis addresses the initiating events well, and there
are emerging possibilities to monitor and mitigate the subsequent
cascading propagation. These considerations can contribute
towards more comprehensive approaches for assessing and miti-
gating the risk of cascading blackouts.
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